Summary overview of Kid Risk, Inc. research on poliovirus risk management (as of July 2017)
Motivated by an interest in appropriately integrating economic, risk, decision, and dynamic disease models to demonstrate the difference between static and dynamic policy models, our polio modeling efforts began in 2001 when we decided to retrospectively characterize the economic benefits of polio risk management in the United States.(1) Discussions in late 2001 with subject matter experts at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention led to our focus on the polio endgame since 2002. We characterized the decision options for post-wild poliovirus (WPV) eradication policies,(2) and developed a differential equation-based dynamic transmission model that included characterization of immunity states associated with WPV infection and vaccination with either oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) or inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV), including asymptomatic infections.(3) Given exclusive use of trivalent OPV (tOPV) at that time, the model characterized a generic serotype and did not consider OPV evolution endogenously.(3) We focused on the global policy level and developed estimates of the costs for the different post WPV-eradication decision options,(4) which we stratified by World Bank Income levels to capture important differences that exist between countries. We also characterized the costs and value of the global poliovirus surveillance system.(5) We provided the first estimates of the risks of vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP) and vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs), including circulating VDPVs (cVDPVs) and immunodeficiency-associated VDPVs (iVDPVs), based on statistical analyses of available data and as a function of different post-WPV eradication policies.(6) We explored post-WPV eradication outbreak response policies, and this analysis provided key insights to the GPEI in 2005 about the benefits of both pre- and post-WPV eradication outbreak response,(7) which led to significant improvements in GPEI outbreak response activities. Most of these papers appeared in a 2006 special issue of Risk Analysis,(8) which also included our perspectives on risk management in a polio-free world (9) and on the collaborative modeling process we created.(10) Our retrospective economic analysis showed significant (hundreds of billions of dollars) net benefits for the US,(1) which helped to strengthen US commitments to polio risk management.
Following the development of all of the model components, we focused on an economic analysis of post-eradication immunization policies. Given the long time horizons considered in the economic analyses, our integrated model included consideration of potential reinfection and asymptomatic participation in transmission of individuals with waned immunity, with paralysis only occurring in fully susceptible individuals. High-level policy discussions related to control vs. eradication in late 2006 motivated us to use our model to estimate the economics of eradication (followed by several different post-WPV eradication immunization policies) compared to a wide range of control options, which demonstrated that eradication represented a better health and economic option than control.(11) Some discussions at the time included significant pessimism about the ability to stop poliovirus transmission in India, and we used our model to suggest that elimination could occur in India with sufficient immunization intensity.(11) We also demonstrated the economic inefficiency of a wavering global commitment to eradication.(11) The economic analysis of post-WPV eradication immunization policies showed that either stopping OPV altogether or switching to IPV dominated continued OPV use after successful eradication of WPVs.(12) IPV represented the option with the highest expected costs but lowest expected cases, while stopping poliovirus immunization represented an option with lower expected costs but some additional expected cases, which led us to recommend research and investment into strategies to reduce IPV costs.(12) We performed extensive uncertainty and sensitivity analyses.(13) These analyses led to recognition of the need for global coordination of OPV cessation and creation of a stockpile for post-WPV eradication outbreak response,(14) and recognition of the importance of ensuring sufficient resources for polio eradication to succeed.(15) Building on our prior analysis of a wavering commitment,(11) we explored the dynamics of priority shifting for eradicable diseases.(16) Recognizing the importance of a stockpile of OPV for post-WPV eradication outbreak response,(14) we developed a framework for optimal stockpile design.(17) We developed an individual-based model version of our polio dynamic disease transmission model that showed the significance of different assumptions about mixing networks.(18) We performed an economic analysis that estimated 40-50 billion US dollars in net benefits for the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) for which our range of estimates depended on whether successfully-coordinated OPV cessation following WPV eradication included global use of IPV or not.(19) We contributed to discussions about the role of economic analyses in evaluation global disease management efforts (20) and the development of eradication investment cases.(21) In 2012, we explored trends in the risks of poliovirus transmission in the US, and we recognized that imported live polioviruses (LPVs) could potentially circulate in a population with high IPV coverage, although the risks in the US appeared low.(22) We also explored the probability of undetected wild poliovirus circulation after apparent global interruption of transmission by extending a simple conceptual analysis.(23)
As the GPEI immunization policies evolved, including widespread use of bivalent OPV (bOPV) for supplemental immunization activities (SIAs), we appreciated the need to expand and update our integrated model. Recognizing the important role of modeling population immunity,(24) and its key role in prevention (25) and we characterized the current global immunization policy options and prerequisites for OPV cessation.(26) We developed a series of papers published in a 2013 special issue of Risk Analysis describing the components of our expanded and updated poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model.(27) We performed a comprehensive expert review of the literature on poliovirus immunity and transmission,(28) and synthesized the information from the experts to (i) numerically characterize an expanded set of immunity states for the model and (ii) identify significant uncertainties despite the large literature.(29) We reviewed the 2012 national polio immunization strategies to characterize current aggregate global policies, and we reviewed the seroconversion literature to characterize variability in vaccine take rates for different vaccines and numbers of doses in different settings.(30) We also updated our prior review of cVDPV risks(6) and reviewed the literature related to understanding and modeling OPV evolution.(31) This analysis (31) allowed us to include OPV evolution and the creation of cVDPVs endogenously in our expanded poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model,(32) which led us to conclude that our prior statistical model for cVDPV risks(6) provided reduced predictive value due to the global shift from exclusive tOPV use until WPV eradication to a strategy of phased serotype-specific OPV cessation. We focused on the need to manage population immunity to transmission considering all individuals in the population, including individuals immune to disease but able to contribute asymptomatically to transmission, most notably those with only IPV-induced immunity.(33) Our expanded model of poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution offered insights from modeling a diverse set of actual experiences with wild and vaccine-related polioviruses.(32) Overall, the expanded poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model: (i) uses 8 recent immunity states to reflect immunity derived from maternal antibodies, only IPV vaccination, only LPV infection, or both IPV vaccination and LPV infection (to more realistically capture the differences in immunity derived from IPV and LPV), (ii) includes multi-stage waning and infection processes (for more realistic characterization of these processes), (iii) characterizes OPV evolution as a 20-stage process from OPV as administered to fully-reverted polioviruses with assumed identical properties to typical homotypic WPVs (to allow cVDPV emergence to occur within the model), (iv) characterizes each serotype separately (to analyze serotype-specific vaccination policies and risks), (v) considers explicitly both fecal-oral and oropharyngeal transmission (to account for the differential impact of IPV on fecal and oropharyngeal excretion), (vi) accounts for heterogeneous preferential mixing between mixing age groups and subpopulations, and (vii) accounts for differences between various IPV and OPV routine immunization schedules and the reality of repeatedly missed children during successive SIAs.(32,34,35)
In 2014, we updated our estimates of IPV costs in the context of exploring national choices related to IPV use with various delivery options.(36) We also modeled the dynamics of OPV cessation without (37) and with IPV,(38) which demonstrated the importance of using sufficient amounts of tOPV in the run up to OPV cessation and the relatively small role that IPV might play in areas with conditions conducive to poliovirus transmission (i.e., relatively high R0, high contribution of fecal-oral transmission). We used our transmission model (32) to characterize the potential impact of expanding target age groups for polio SIAs,(34) and to stop and prevent poliovirus transmission in two high-risk areas in northern India (35) and in the high-risk area of northwest Nigeria.(39) We used an individual-based model to characterize the potential for transmission of polioviruses following introduction into Amish communities in North America.(40) Consistent with our prior recognition of potential circulation of LPVs in areas with high IPV coverage,(22) following the observation of WPV serotype 1 transmission in Israel, we modeled population immunity to transmission and management strategies for Israel.(41) Insights from our modeling suggest the importance of focusing on immunization program performance to maintain population immunity to transmission, as the key to success in the polio endgame.(42) Many of our recent modeling studies emphasize the failure to vaccinate as the primary cause of delay in achieving and maintaining WPV eradication, and the importance of heterogeneity in populations that leads to pockets of preferentially-mixing under-immunized individuals that can sustain transmission.(34,35,39-41) In contrast to some other areas in the US, we recently reported relatively little heterogeneity in six counties in Central Florida at high risk of importations due to international family attractions.(43) We presented and published highlights of the policy impacts of our modeling for which we received the 2014 INFORMS Edelman Award.(44)
In 2015, we provided an overview of the information from different types of poliovirus surveillance activities and we modeled the potential for undetected live poliovirus circulation after apparent interruption of transmission,(45) based on our earlier exploration (23) of a theoretical analysis that quantified undetected circulation in a hypothetical population. We characterized global importations and cVDPVs since 2000 and showed that over 50 countries failed to maintain sufficient population immunity to transmission to prevent paralytic cases from cVDPVs or imported WPVs.(46) We also modeled three countries that use IPV-only for routine immunization (the US, the Netherlands, and Israel) and demonstrated the decline in population immunity in transmission that occurs when countries switch from using OPV to using IPV-only.(46) An editorial related to an article that reviewed the safety data for IPV in the US described the good news for billions of children who will receive IPV with the global introduction of IPV in all OPV-using countries.(47) Looking closely at northwest Nigeria, we explored the trade-offs associated with different strategies to manage population immunity to transmission that demonstrated the importance of using more tOPV in SIAs in the run-up to OPV2 cessation.(48)
We published a series of articles in a special issue of BMC Infectious Diseases on integrated modeling and management of poliovirus endgame risks and policies that aimed to help national, regional, and global health leaders as they navigate the polio endgame from 2013-2052. Modeling the long-term risks requires characterization of the potential for reintroductions of iVDPVs from a small number of individuals with primary B-cell-related immune-deficiencies,(49) for which we reviewed the evidence collected since our 2006 analysis.(6) We developed and used an integrated global model that characterized the risks, costs, and benefits of different future poliovirus risk management options for 2013-2052 compared to the 2013 baseline that included continued widespread use of OPV.(50) Using both the global model (50) and a model of northern Nigeria,(48) we showed the importance of vaccine choice and preferential use of tOPV in the run up to globally-coordinated cessation of serotype 2 OPV (i.e., OPV2 cessation) then-planned and since implemented in late April 2016.(51) Recognizing the importance of significant tOPV use, we estimated tOPV and bOPV needs through 2020.(52) As global health policy makers were approaching the final decision point for establishing the timing of OPV2 cessation, we explored alternative OPV cessation timing options.(53) We demonstrated the importance of rapid and aggressive outbreak response after OPV cessation and during the polio endgame.(54) In anticipation of coordinated OPV2 cessation, we explored the risks of potential non-synchronous OPV2 cessation (55) and of inadvertent tOPV use after OPV2 cessation.(56)
For the global model (50) we performed an uncertainty and sensitivity analysis of cost assumptions.(57) Recognizing the importance of maintaining high population immunity for serotypes 1 and 3 prior to future coordinated bOPV cessation, we demonstrated the benefits of high levels of continued bOPV use and sustaining OPV production through bOPV cessation.(58) Building on our prior characterization of iVDPV risks,(49) we modeled the impact of comprehensive screening to find and treat asymptomatic iVDPV excretors.(59) We explored the potential benefits of investments in a new poliovirus vaccine assuming the best attributes of OPV and IPV.(60) We highlighted the importance of maintaining preparedness throughout the polio endgame.(61) We demonstrated the minor role of IPV in outbreak response when used in conjunction with OPV and showed that IPV in addition to OPV for outbreak response does not represent a cost-effective option compared to using OPV alone.(62) We also explored the need to maintain suffiicient poliovirus vaccine supplies and stockpiles for outbreak response in the polio endgame.(63) We assessed the economic benefits of temporary recommendations for international travel immunization requirements for countries with transmission of serotype 1 wild polioviruses(64) Recognizing the increasing role of environmental surveillance for polioviruses, we systematically reviewed published poliovirus environmental surveillance studies and reported information related to the design, cost, and effectiveness of these systems.(65) We also explored the dynamics of die-out of serotype 2 polioviruses after homotypic OPV cessation and lessons learned from its cessation relevant to the cessation of serotypes 1 and 3.(66) Reviewing insights from prior modeling,(34,35,39-41) we demonstrated how under-vaccinated subpopulations can sustain poliovirus transmission despite high coverage in the surrounding population, depending on the degree of mixing and the size of the under-vaccinated subpopulation.(67)
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